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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
DONALD EUGENE LEWIS, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 930513-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF CASE 
In proceedings before the Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, Utah, 
the Honorable David L. Mower presiding, Defendant was convicted of two counts of 
Unlawful Taking of Wildlife, each a class A misdemeanor; two counts of Aiding and 
Assisting in the Unlawful Taking of Wildlife, each a class A misdemeanor; and four counts 
of Wasting Protected Wildlife, each a class B misdemeanor. He appeals each conviction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Defendant's notice of appeal timely filed? 
1 
2. Was Defendant denied assistance of counsel? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Where the record is devoid of any evidence indicating a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel, a correction-of-error standard of 
review is applied. See Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right. . . to the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel . . . and the right to appeal in all 
cases. . . . 
Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall 
include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following 
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right 
to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In two separate proceedings, Defendant was charged with four class A 
misdemeanors and four class B misdemeanors all relating to unlawfully taking or wasting 
protected wildlife (R 153-56, 170-72). He retained counsel, Brian R. Florence and R. 
Clayton Huntsman, and pled not guilty (R 164-65, 168-69). 
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On October 15, 1992, Florence moved for leave to withdraw as defense 
counsel (R 50-52). On October 21, Huntsman also sought leave to withdraw but failed to 
send Defendant a copy of the motion (R 86-88). The state's prosecutor immediately sent 
Defendant a notice to substitute counsel (R 48-49, 89). Defendant's motion to suppress 
physical evidence and the state's motion to consolidate the two cases for trial were then 
pending (R 50-52, 54-57, 59-62). 
On November 20,1992, the district court allowed defense counsel to withdraw 
and consolidated the cases (R 32-34). The court signed the order on December 14, 1992, 
and it was mailed to Defendant on December 17, 1992 (R 32-34). Other than the notice the 
state sent before the court approved the withdrawal of defense counsel, there is nothing in 
the record indicating that Defendant was given notice to appoint successor counsel. 
Furthermore, the record indicates that the order mailed on December 17 was Defendant's 
first notice that the court had allowed his counsel to withdraw.1 
When Defendant failed to appear for trial on December 21,1992, the district 
court proceeded in his absence and without the participation of defense counsel (R 27-29; 
T 4-7). Defendant was found guilty on all counts (R 28; T 215). 
Upon Defendant's failure to appear for sentencing on January 22, 1993, the 
court proceeded to impose sentence in his absence (R 17; ST 3-11). The district court failed 
to advise Defendant of his right of appeal or the time within which any such appeal must 
be taken (R 17; ST 3-11). The judgment and sentence was entered on February 22, 1993 
The record indicates that the district court authorized Huntsman's withdrawal on November 20. The 
mailing certificate indicates that the order was mailed to Florence and the state's prosecutor on December 2 
(R 82-84). No copy was mailed to Defendant. 
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(R 6-9). 
On July 15, 1993, Defendant voluntarily returned to the state of Utah where 
he appeared before the district court for the first time following his conviction (R 2-3). At 
that hearing the court modified Defendant's sentence, suspending execution of all but 60 
days of the jail time previously imposed and placing Defendant on probation (R 182-83). 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on August 13, 1993 (R 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's time to appeal did not begin to run until he was advised of his 
right of appeal pursuant to Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant's 
notice of appeal was timely filed. 
Defendant never waived his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. 
His conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED. 
Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in relevant part: 
"Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed." 
The only Utah case which counsel has located dealing with the consequences 
of a trial court's failure to follow the mandate of Rule 22(c) is Crowe v. State, 649 P.2d 2 
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(Utah 1982). This was an appeal from a judgment denying post-conviction relief. The only 
issue on the appeal was "the right to be informed by the court after sentencing of the right 
to appeal." Id. at 2. 
The Utah Supreme Court found error but determined that it was harmless 
because the trial court had told the defendant at trial and after verdict that he had a right 
of appeal. The supreme court concluded: "The fact that the court did not advise plaintiff 
again of his right to appeal at sentencing time was harmless error." [Emphasis in original.] 
Id. at 2. The holding in Crowe is arguably based on "substantial compliance" rather than a 
harmless error analysis. 
Other jurisdictions having rules similar to Rule 22(c) have developed various 
remedies for error arising out of the trial court's failure to advise a defendant of his right 
of appeal. In Kirk v. United States, 447 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1971), the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right of appeal 
pursuant to Rule 32(a)(2), F.R.Cr.P., required vacation of the defendant's sentence and 
resentencing which would afford him a new opportunity for appeal. The court concluded 
that it would be presumed without factual inquiry that the trial court's failure to advise the 
defendant was the cause of defendant's failure to perfect his appeal. 
The First Circuit reached substantially the same result in United States v. 
Benthien, 434 F.2d 1031 (1st Cir. 1970). In that case the court concluded: 
The obvious purpose of Rule 32(a)(2) is to insure that all defendants 
who might wish to appeal are fully aware of their appeal rights. That 
purpose, we believe, is best served by allowing a section 2255 motion 
to reinstate an appeal whenever the trial court has failed to comply 
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with the rule, without regard to whether or not the defendant has 
obtained knowledge of his rights from some other source. 
Id. at 1032. 
See also, Nance v. United States, 422 R2d 590 (7th Or. 1970)(resentencing 
required notwithstanding defendant's admission that he knew he had right of appeal but that 
he was unaware of availability of appeal in forma pauperis); Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 
781 (4th Or. 1971); United States v. Butler, 938 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1991). CL Hannigan v. 
United States, 341 F.2d 587 (10th Or. 1965)(time for filing notice of appeal does not 
commence to run until the defendant has been advised of his right to appeal). See 
generally, C.Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal §528, pp. 125-27 (1982). 
Various state courts have reached similar results. See State v. Mitchell, 231 
Kan. 144, 642 P.2d 981 (1982) (following Benthien); Bovd v. State, 282 A.2d 169 (Me. 
1971)(appeal reinstated); State v. Fletcher, 174 N.J. Super. 609, 417 A.2d 106 (1980) (leave 
to appeal nunc pro tunc granted); State v. Carmody, 243 N.W. 2d 348 (N.D. 1976)(sentence 
invalid). 
In State v. Mitchell, supra, the Kansas Supreme Court simply considered the 
merits of the appeal "out of time11 rather than remanding the matter for resentencing. 
Boyd v. State, supra, involved a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 
petitioner who had not been advised by the trial court of his right to pursue an appeal, 
contended that he should be allowed to treat habeas corpus proceedings as an appeal raising 
issues which could only be properly raised on a direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Maine concluded that "the time for taking an appeal from the Superior Court in a 
criminal case will not commence to run until Rule 37(c)[comparable to F.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2)], 
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where appUcable, has been complied with." 282 A.2d at 172. Accordingly, rather than 
expanding the scope of habeas corpus proceedings or remanding for resentencing which 
would have revived the right to appeal, the supreme court directed the clerk of the Superior 
Court to enter notice of appeal on the petitioner's behalf and he was allowed to pursue the 
direct appeal. 
Likewise, in State v. Fletcher, supra, the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division, concluded that the time for taking an appeal did not begin to run until 
the defendant had been advised by the trial court of his right of appeal. In so holding, the 
New Jersey court noted: 
Our judicial system contemplates one appeal as of right to a court of 
general appellate jurisdiction. This appeal is afforded usually in this 
court. [Citations omitted.] R.2:4-l(a) requires that all appeals from 
final judgments from courts be taken within 45 days of their entry. 
While R.2:4-4(a) grants to this court the power to extend the time 
within which an appeal may be taken "upon a showing of good cause 
and the absence of prejudice," it may not expend the time for a period 
exceeding 30 days and then only if the notice of appeal was in fact 
served and filed within the time as extended. These time limitations 
are both mandatory and jurisdictional. [Citation omitted.] 
Nevertheless, when a trial judge does not inform a defendant of his 
right to appeal and, if indigent his right to appeal as an indigent, as 
required by R.3:21-4(f), strict compliance with these time limitations so 
as to effectively deny defendant of his right to appeal may well create 
a harsh and unjust result. Consequently, we adopt the view that the 
mandatory time limit for taking an appeal does not begin to run until 
a defendant is advised by the trial judge of his rights in accordance 
with R.3:21-4(f). Since that was not done here, justice demands that 
defendant be permitted to appeal nunc pro tunc. 
417 A.2d at 109. 
In the instant case, the district court failed to advise Defendant of his right of 
appeal, either during the trial, after the verdict, at the time of sentencing, or by 
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correspondence had or written notice given thereafter. 
The trial court's failure to advise Defendant of his right of appeal can hardly 
be characterized as harmless, particularly in light of the fact that Defendant's counsel had 
withdrawn. Nor can it be said that the district court substantially complied with the mandate 
of Rule 22(c). Defendant's claim should be considered on direct appeal.2 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
When Defendant failed to appear for trial, the district court's inquiries related 
almost exclusively to the issue of whether or not Defendant had received notice of the trial 
setting (T 4-6). The only statement the court made regarding Defendant's right to the 
assistance of counsel was the following observation: 
THE COURT: He had two lawyers at one time and they both sent 
him a notice to appoint counsel.3 
T 5 . 
The district court then concluded: 
THE COURT: Well, I'm satisfied that Mr. Lewis knows about these 
proceedings today and has voluntarily chosen not to appear and the 
motion, by the state, to proceed in the absence of Mr. Lewis is granted. 
T 6 . 
It is noted that under the facts of this case, the relief sought on appeal is arguably available on habeas 
corpus. 
^ e district court apparently refers to the motions for leave to withdraw (R 50-52, 86-88). Counsel was 
allowed to withdraw in violation of the provisions of Rule 4-604, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, where 
it appears that notice of Huntsman's motion was never sent to Defendant. 
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There is nothing in the record indicating a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
Defendant's right to the assistance of counsel. 
In Wagstaff v.Barnes. 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990), Wagstaff had retained 
counsel by the name of Herm Olson. Later Olson requested leave to withdraw supporting 
his motion with an affidavit which stated that Wagstaff had failed and refused to contact 
Olson and that it had become impossible for counsel to adequately prepare a defense. The 
court allowed Olson to withdraw nearly two months prior to the scheduled jury trial. The 
record was unclear as to whether or not Wagstaff had received notice of Olson's withdrawal 
and there was no indication whether the trial court had ascertained Wagstaffs financial 
status and eligibility for appointed counsel. 
When Wagstaff failed to appear for trial, the district court concluded that his 
absence was voluntary and granted the state's motion to proceed in Wagstaffs absence. 
Following his conviction and after exhausting his direct appeal,4 Wagstaff filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been denied the assistance of counsel. The 
petition was dismissed and Wagstaff appealed. 
The court of appeals concluded that Wagstaff s "voluntary absence from trial, 
in and of itself, was not a waiver of his right to counsel and that there is no further evidence 
in the record to indicate such waiver." Id at 779. In reversing the dismissal of the petition, 
the court of appeals concluded: 
Absent evidence in the record of affirmative, knowing, and intelligent 
action by Wagstaff that might reasonably be construed as a waiver, we 
4See State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that defendant waived right to be present 
at trial). 
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must conclude that there has been no waiver and Wagstaff was entitled 
to be represented by counsel at trial even if he chose not to be there 
himself. Because Wagstaff was not represented by counsel at trial, his 
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. 
Id. 
In the instant case, Defendant was not represented by counsel at trial. The 
record does not reflect his waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. His conviction was 
unconstitutionally obtained and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that Defendant's notice of 
appeal was timely filed and that his conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel. The convictions must be reversed and the case remanded 
to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this l 4 day June, 1994. 
[Sl 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Phone: (801)628-4411 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this I'j day of June, 1994,1 did personally mail 
two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to Jan Graham, Utah 
Attorney General, 236 State Capital Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
151 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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ADDENDUM 
The texts of relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are reproduced verbatim 
on page 2 of the brief and are accordingly not reproduced here. 
A copy of the Judgment, Sentence and Order of Forfeiture is included at the request of the 
Clerk's office. A determination of the issues presented on this appeal do not require review 
or construction of the language of this document. 
Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone 801-644-5278 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
DONALD E. LEWIS, ] 
Defendant. ; 
> JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
AND ORDER OF FORFEITURE 
CASE NO. 91-CR-0071 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for sentencing 
before the above-entitled Court on Friday the 2 2nd day of 
January, 1993, at Kanab, Utah* The Plaintiff was present and was 
represented by the Kane County Attorney• The Defendant did not 
appear either in person or by counsel. 
SENTENCING 
IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT that for each of the four 
(4) class A misdemeanor the Defendant be confined and imprisoned 
in the Kane County Jail for a period of one (1) year for a total 
of four (4) years, and for each of the four (4) class B 
misdemeanors the Defendant be confined and imprisoned in the Kane 
County Jail for a period of six (6) months for a total of twenty 
four (24) months, all suspended except for two (2) years. 
V ;t .. A , 
' ' ',• r 
m. 
ni { 
State vs. Lewis 
Judgment 
Case No . 91-CR-0071 
Page 2 
The Defendant is fined as follows: for each class A 
misdemeanor the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($2,500.00), plus an 85% surcharge, and for each class B 
misdemeanor the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00), plus 
an 85% surcharge for a total of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($25,900.00) . 
It is further ordered that the Defendant pay restitution to 
the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources Help Stop Poaching Fund 
in the amount of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,600.00), 
FORFEITURE 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following items be forfeited 
to the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 
1. Remington 7mm mag model 700 with Redfield scope serial # 
A6764329 with beige gun case. 
2. Weatherby 270 mag with Redfield scope and bipod Serial # 
129743 with black guncase with bore sight sling. 
3. Remington 30.06 model 700 Serial # C6345364 with Bushnell 
scope with hard guncase. 
4. Hatchet 
5. Blacksaw 
State vs. Lewis 
Judgment 
CAse No. 921600018 
Page 3 
6. Bucksight knife 
7- Silver pocket knife 
8. Photo album containing pictures of unlawfully taken wildlife 
9. 6 VHS video tapes showing illegally taken wildlife 
10. Black vinyl brief case (and contents) containing notes of 
illegal activity and future illegal activity 
11. Thompson Center Anns .357 (Herret) handgun Serial # 228086 
with Tasco scope with detachable rifle stock. 
12. 1 pair blue trax sneakers 
13. 1 pair Browning Nomad boots 
14- 1988 Chevrolet pick up Alaska Plate 9217 CN Vin # 
IGCFK24HOJZ14334 
WARRANT 
The Court hereby authorizes the issuance of a no bond 
warrant. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court retains jurisdiction over all sentencing 
matters. 
State vs. Lewis 
Judgment 
Case No. 91-CR-0071 
Page 4 
BAIL 
Bail in this matter will be forfeited to pay the 
restitution as well as the fines in this case. 
DATED this W day of 'r^& , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
D£VID L, MOWER 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
lJfJLUATJbJ 
C^9a day ot^llw/MAfk' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 
1993, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above 
foregoing Judgment, with first-class postage, to: Donald Lewis, 
71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL. 35016. 
